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I. Introduction.
This paper sets out a Marxian model in which the preconditions for the breakdown of
capitalism emerge. That is, it shows how the accumulation of capital will cause the
organic composition of capital to rise, the rate of profit to fall and the rate of
exploitation to rise. For convenience this causal chain will be referred to as the central
relations.
Duncan Foley in his introduction to Marx’s economics (1986 p. 10) makes the
distinction between a theory, which is a possibly internally contradictory set of ideas
about the world, and a model, which is a logically correct but necessarily more limited
description. The construct presented here is a Marxian model in the sense that it is based
solely on elements found in Marx’s writing, contains no internal contradictions and is
not necessarily consistent with every statement that Marx made. Specifically it is a
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2version of Stephen Marglin’s (1984) fixed wage, one sector neo-Marxian model with
continuous substitution that is expanded by adding technical progress and land as a
factor of production.2 I  this context, under a simple assumption on the production
function, it is shown that the central relations are valid.
The paper is composed of four sections and two appendixes. The first appendix
contains detailed discussions of a number of issues that are important but tangential to
the main argument of the paper. The second appendix is principally devoted to the proof
of the theorem.
With regard to the sections, Section II sets out the model and gives an intuitive
explanation of the result. Section III traces the theme of the central relations and the
breakdown of capitalism in the writing of Marx and Marxist writers. Marx first thought
that the movements of the rates of profit and exploitation would bring on the crisis that
would end capitalism, but later he gave more weight to the rise in the organic
composition because this centralised and concentrated the ownership of capital.
Marxian writers moved though a variety of phases but since the 1970s they have
focused on movements in the rate of profit and been divided into two camps by their
reaction to the Okishio theorem with the profit squeeze group accepting that the rate can
fall only if the wage rises and the capital logic group attempting to avoid this
conclusion. As a result, the theme of the breakdown of capitalism has, for the most part,
disappeared from the Marxian discourse.
Section IV which concludes makes two points, one concerning models and the other
methodology. With respect to modelling, the establishment of the central relations in the
context of a fixed wage model may allow  the formalisation of many of the breakdown
arguments as, for example, the one connected with concentration and centralisation.
This would serve to bring the end of capitalism back into the Marxian discourse. With
respect to methodology one must ask what the value is of a model that assumes a
counter factual constant wage and has as a major conclusion the empirically improbable
breakdown of capitalism? The answer is that it allows us to see where Marx went wrong
and, at the same time, judge how fragile the current success of capitalism is.
II. The Model and the Result
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3The model and the results are set out in this section. The model is an augmented and
specialised version of Marglin’s (1984, chap. 9) one sector neo-Marxian model with
continuous substitution. It is augmented by adding technical progress and land and it is
specialised by using a particular production function and the simplest version of the
savings function.
The specific production function that produces output Y is CES in a Cobb-Douglas
capital/labour aggregate and land, where K, L, and M are capital, labour and land.
(1)                          Y=[a(KbL1-be-gt)-r +(1-a)(Medt)-r ]-1/r
The aggregate experiences factor augmenting technical progress at rate g > 0 while l nd
experiences it at rate d ‡ 0. The elasticity of substitution between the aggregate and land
is s  = 
1
1+ r
 , -1 £ r  £ ¥  , where 0 £ a, b £ 1 are parameters and t is time. This may be
interpreted either as a net production function or a gross production function with zero
depreciation (see appendix I.3). The constant real wage w and the rental on capital r are
equal to their respective marginal products,
(2)                                                   w = ¶Y/¶L
(3)                                                    r = ¶Y/¶K.
The rate of return on investment in land, which is its marginal product plus the capital
gain  P
•
  divided by the price, is equal to the return on capital,3
(4)                                                   r=
¶Y
¶M + P
•
æ 
Ł 
ö 
ł / P,
where P is the price in terms of the good. Capitalists are assumed to own the land as
well as capital. Their rate of profit R is defined as
(5)            R=
Y + P
•
M - wL
K + PM
  .
It is easily shown that r = R (see lemma 1, appendix II), that is that the rate of profit is
equal to the marginal product of capital. Savings are provided only by capitalists who
save all their income. Their savings are equal to the accumulation of wealth,
(6)       P
•
M + K
•
= Y + P
•
M - wL .
The assumption that all profits are saved removes P
•
M fr m the accumulation equation
and immensely simplifies the model. This seems justified since the effect of changing
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•
 is the derivative of x with respect to time.
4land prices on capitalist saving seems to play no role in Marx's writing. It is assumed
that factor augmenting technical progress is slower for land than for the aggregate,
(7)        d  < g  .
Marx (TSV vol. III, 1972, pp. 300-1) specifically assumed that this was the case and,
moreover, one must have this if the fixed stock of land is to lead, in some cases, to a
falling rate of profit. Finally the definitions of the two other Marxian concepts are as
follows. The organic composition of capital is K/L = k. There are two definitions of the
rate of exploitation, ei :
(8)   e1 =
rK +
¶ Y
¶ M
M
wL
=
Y
wL
- 1
(9) e2 =
L - Lm
Lm
=
L
Lm
- 1
where  necessary labour Lm is given by
(10)    wL   =    a K b Lm
1-b eg t( ) - r + 1 - a( ) Med t( ) - r[ ] - 1/r  .
e1 corresponds to surplus value divided by variable capital. e2 corresponds to surplus
labour divided by necessary labour, that is the labour needed to produce the wage bill.
(See appendix I.4 for a general discussion of these definitions.) This concludes the
presentation of the model.
The model yields a single differential equation in K in the following manner. (2)
determines L as a function of K and t, L(K,t). Thus output also depends on these two
variables, Y(K,L,t) = Y(K,L(K,t),t). Substituting these into (6) gives the non-
autonomous differential equation
(11)           K
·
= f(K,t)      K(0) = K0 > 0
where K0, the initial capital stock, is assumed to be positive. The initial-value problem
(11) has a solution K(t). Taking account of the dependence of L on K and t, this solution
implies the time paths of the key variables, k(t), R(t) , e1  and e2(t).
The characteristics of these time paths are given by the following theorem.
Theorem: For the model of equation (1)-(10), there exists a t*, such that, for t > t* :
a) If r  > 0 (s  < 1) then
 k ®µ   and  k
·
 > 0 ,
5 R ®  0 and  R
·
 < 0,
  ei®µ  and  e
·
i  > 0       i = 1,2.
b) If r  = 0 , (s  = 1)  then
 k ® 0    and  k
·
 < 0 ,
 R ®  µ  and  R
·
 > 0,
 ei  =  a constant,          i = 1,2.
c) If r  < 0 (s  > 1) then
 k ® 0   and  k
·
 < 0 ,
 R ®  µ  and  R
·
 > 0,
 ei® ei*  and  e
·
i  < 0,   ei*  a constant,  i = 1,2.
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The proof is quite complicated and is left to appendix II but the outline can be
sketched verbally. For all values of s  we have two properties. First K approaches
infinity since profits are always positive. Second the "ratio" of efficiency units of land
to the aggregate 
Med t
K b L1- b eg t
 approaches zero.  Suppose it did not. Then it must be that L
approaches zero and thus K/L also approaches infinity.5 The wage increases with a rise
in K/L and decreases with a rise in the ratio of the aggregate to land. Thus the approach
of K/L to infinity and the bound on the rise of the ratio imply that the wage approaches
infinity which is impossible.
First consider how the value of the elasticity of substitution s  effects the movements
of the organic composition of capital. On the one hand let s  < 1. In this case the slowest
growing factor dominates and eventually K will grow a rate d .  Now suppose that K/L is
constant. Then L grows at d  and the aggregate at d  + g so that the ratio falls at rate g .
Since s  < 1, prices move faster than quantities so that the wage falls faster than g
because of this and only rises by g  because of technical progress. Thus, to keep the wage
constant K/L , the organic composition of capital, must rise. On the other hand, if s > 1,
the fastest growing factor dominates. If K/L were constant the marginal product of
labour would grow at g . Thus to keep the wage constant K/L, this time, must fall.
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5 Since g > d  , if L did not approach zero, then the ratio would approach zero.
6The movements of the rate of profit follow directly from the movements of the
organic composition. The Cobb-Douglas form of the aggregate means that the ratio of
the marginal products of labour and capital depends only on K/L. Thus from the
previous paragraph the rate of profit falls if s  < 1 and rises if s > 1.
Finally consider the movements of the first definition of exploitation. On the one
hand let s < 1. We saw that K/L must rise to keep the wage from falling. But the effect
of this is blunted by the relative growth of the aggregate that lowers the marginal
products of the factors it contains. To compensate for this, the efficiency units of land
per capita must grow as well. Output per man depends on the aggregate per man and
efficiency units of land per man. Since both of these increase, output per man and the
rate of exploitation in terms of the first definition increases as well. On the other hand
let s  > 1. We saw that K/L must fall to keep the wage from rising. Since s  > 1 and since
the aggregate is the faster rising factor this effect dominates so that output per man and
the first version of the rate of exploitation fall. The logic for the movement of the
second definition is more involved but basically the same.
While I hope that the reader will agree that this is a Marxian model in the sense
defined in the introduction, he or she may strongly feel that this is not the way Marx
saw things; in particular the neo-classical production function and the importance of
land may rankle. In a paper that is forthcoming in this journal I have provided an
extensive justification for the model as a representation of Marx’s thought. Specifically
I use Marglin’s (1984) arguments to justify the production function, the arguments of a
considerable number of writers to substantiate Marx’s linking of the falling rate of profit
to resource scarcity and finally extensive quotations from Marx to show that he thought
pressure on the land would be an important cause of the revolution that would destroy
capitalism. (See appendices I.5 and I.1 for discussions of one of the writers (Meek) and
the relation of the model to Ricardo.) I understand that this position may conflict with
the reader’s long held opinions and that in the end it may not be found convincing but I
hope that he or she will look at my forthcoming paper before dismissing the position out
of hand.
III. The Central Relations and the Breakdown of Capitalism in the
   Works of Marx and Marxist Writers.
7This section gives a compressed description of the way in which the theme of the
central relations and the breakdown of capitalism varied in Marx’s writing over his life
time and has since undergone continuous change in the works of Marxist writers. The
object is to provide the reader with a convenient summary rather than make any original
points. The section on Marx is taken from Simon Clark’s excellent book (1994) while
the section on Marxist writers is taken from the relevant chapters of Michael Howard
and John King’s monumental “History of Marxian Economics”. Only in the description
of the 1990s does the author’s opinion intrude.
1. Marx.
The central relations played an important role in Marx's writing about the breakdown
of Capitalism. Two themes appear: that of crises, periods in which the rates of profit
and growth and the level of employment all fall rapidly, and that of secular trends. The
weight that Marx placed on these two themes as causes of the end of capitalism varied
over his lifetime. According to Clarke, crises were more important during the middle
period that started with the failure of the 1848 revolutions and ended with the
abandonment of the Grundrisse in March of 1858. The emphasis was stronger on
secular trends in the earlier period which included the Manifesto and the later period in
which Marx wrote the notebooks from which volumes II and III of Capital and Theories
of Surplus Value were taken and volume I itself.
Clarke sums up the Grundrisse as follows: He notes that underconsumption,
overproduction and disproportionality are all intertwined.6  He says that one may find a
number of scenarios. First (p. 166), that the falling rate of profit may lead to
overproduction and thus a crisis, but he notes that neither the mechanism which causes
the fall nor the way this produces overproduction is demonstrated. Second (p. 171-2),
he describes a scenario that operates through disproportionality. He stresses that Marx
did not think that a mere fall in the rate of profit could cause a fall in investment and
thus a crisis. Rather the route is that a rising organic composition of capital will lead to
disproportionality and, in addition, "the falling rate of profit will introduce
disproportionalities as capital is diverted into speculative channels." Thus, concludes
Clarke, the falling rate of profit and the rising organic composition of capital are linked
to crises but not in a clear way.
                                                
6These are different causes of crises: underconsumption is when there is a lack of demand for consumer
goods usually due to low worker income; overproduction is when there is an excess supply of all goods;
8 In addition Clark (p. 172) states that there are three other points that are of the same
level of importance as the preceding scenarios and which are linked to the rising
organic composition of capital and rate of surplus value and the falling rate of profit.
They are: first, that the falling rate of profit intensifies class conflict as capitalists put
pressure on workers in an attempt to maintain profits; second, that the rising rate of
surplus value increases the vulnerability of the economy to crises as a greater proportion
of aggregate demand is made up of the more volatile investment demand;7 and third, the
rising organic composition of capital and mass of surplus value is associated with the
centralisation of ownership and the pauperisation of an ever wider strata of the
population. These last three points are relevant, not for the generation of specific crises,
but as explanations of the secular trends.
In the period between 1850 and 1857 Marx and Engels expected that capitalism
would end with the next crisis. When the crisis of 1857 passed without event, their
perspective changed. In this sense the Grundrisse is a work of transition, it is both an
attempt to understand the reason that crises occur because they had seemed so
important and the beginning of the attempt to understand the secular forces which
would lead to the end of capitalism (p. 175).
Turning to the notebooks of 1861-5, there is a change in content and emphasis.
According to Clarke's summary (p. 240-5), the driving force is the increase in the
organic composition of capital that has two effects. First, the centralisation of
ownership is given more stress. Capitalists, to avoid having their profit rate fall, attempt
to increase the rate of surplus value. This leads to greater centralisation as the smaller
capitalists are at a disadvantage, both technically and with regard to access to credit,
and are forced into risky ventures.  Second, the rising organic composition of capital
leads to the creation of the reserve army of the unemployed but the description of this is
mixed, in a confusing way, with the falling rate of profit.  Thus the rising rate of surplus
value has disappeared as a cause of instability, the effect of the rising organic
composition of capital on centralisation has received more stress and the reserve army,
linked with the falling rate of profit, has made its appearance.
                                                                                                                                              
and disproportionality is when there is disequilibrium so that some goods are in excess supply while
others are in excess demand.
7 Clarke says mass of surplus value here but on p. 168 where he is describing the phenomenon in detail he
says rate. Moreover the logic requires the proportion of capitalist spending to worker spending to rise. For
these two reasons it seems permissible to insert rate in the paraphrase.
9Finally, turning to Volume I, the falling rate of profit has completely disappeared
and the increase in the organic composition of capital has assumed centre stage. This
has two effects: the first is, again, the centralisation of ownership where the link
between the rising organic composition of capital and the technical efficiency of large
units of capital is stressed. The second is that the appearance of the reserve army is now
concisely explained without reference to the falling rate of profit (p. 252). Clarke gives
a long exposition of the interaction between wages and accumulation (pp. 249-259) the
gist of which, I think, is that, although it might require a crisis to motivate them,
capitalists react to a potential shortage of labour by increasing the organic composition
of capital in a way that re-establishes the reserve army and ensures that capitalism can
continue to expand.
The importance of these two effects is expressed in the "absolute general law of
capitalist accumulation which defines the necessary polarisation of capitalist society
between the growing power and wealth of capital on the one hand, and the growing
misery of the mass of the population, expressed in the growth of the relative surplus
population which constitutes the reserve army of labour and the pauperised layer of the
working class on the other." (p. 251).
To summarise: the falling rate of profit, the rising rate of exploitation and the rising
organic composition of capital all play their roles in breakdown of capitalism. The
falling rate of profit and the rising rate of exploitation have heavier weight in the middle
period in which Marx saw the end of capitalism as coming suddenly as the result of a
crisis, while the rising organic composition of capital comes to the fore in the later
period when Marx gave more emphasis to secular trends.
2. Marxist Writers.
Marxist writers have used both the central relations and pure underconsumptionism
as the basis for their explanations of the breakdown of capitalism. In addition these
explanations have been influenced by both economic and intellectual events. A brief
review is now presented.
The orthodox Marxian position was set out by Karl Kautsky in the Erfurt Programme
of 1891 and his book “The Class Struggle “ of 1892. Kautsky sees the breakdown as
being brought on by the increasing misery of the proletariate, the growing inequality of
wealth and income and the evermore-frequent crises. These are caused in part by a
concentration of capital, which is brought on by the falling rate of profit, but mainly by
a lack of aggregate demand. Under attack from Edward Bernstein, Kautsky shifted
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ground considerably: he admitted that the immiseration was only relative and,
forgetting his previous writings (according to H&K), denied that there was a breakdown
theory. H&K summarise this as “Kautsky’s discussion of crises reveals the dominance
of underconsumptionist ideas in Marxist thought before 1914 together with the
marginality of the falling rate of profit and wide spread suspicion of disproportionality
models of crisis.” (vol. 1, p. 84). [vol. 1,  pp. 67-84]8
 Rudolf Hilferding reacted to both the centralisation of economic power in Germany
and the growing international tension with “Finance Capital” of 1910. His theory
emphasises the centralisation of control of industry. Crises are worsened because of
disproportionality caused by the slowness of cartels to react and also by the falling rate
of profit brought on by the rising organic composition of capital. But the centralised
control allows the crises to be muted so that capitalism’s problem lies elsewhere. The
falling rate of profit, this time caused by rising wages on a tightening home labour
market, will bring on imperialistic expansion and increasingly violent conflicts out of
which will emerge the dictatorship of the proletariat. (Kautsky concurred but thought
the spur to imperialism would be, rather than labour, a scarcity of agricultural
resources.) H&K note that Hilferding’s book has had an influence second only to that of
Capital. [vol. 1,  pp. 94-103]
The First World War and the Russian revolution did not spark quality innovations in
the breakdown idea. Rosa Luxemburg saw imperialism as a reaction to insufficient
demand. Otto Bauer used Marx’s reproduction schemes to show the flaws in her
argument and attributed the breakdown either to shortages of labour and resources if
expansion abroad was blocked or imperialistic wars if it was not. [vol. 1, pp. 106-26]
Finally H&K find the Russian work on these issues “actually rather unimpressive” both
because of their interest in the development of the Solviet Union and because of the
heavy weight of Leninism (vol. 1,  p. 297).
The next major work on the breakdown of capitalism was that of Henryk Grossman,
published in 1929. He extended the number of periods in Bauer’s model, which has an
increasing organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit, and found that the
model eventually broke down because the surplus value was insufficient for the
required investment and because capitalists were unable to consume. (Thus Bauer had a
breakdown model without realising it.) Grossman’s argument was deeply flawed but
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striking for three reasons: it was the first time that Marx’s volume III arguments had
been used as the basis of a breakdown theory, it was the first time that the cause of the
breakdown had been located in production and accumulation rather than realisation and
circulation and, finally, this second notion has become a fundamental tenant of a major
stream of thought in Marxian political economy. [vol. 1,  pp. 316-32]
The attempts by Marxists to understand the depression of the 1930s demonstrated a
change in the concept of the end of capitalism. H&K note (vol. 2,  p. 4) that “In general
the breakdown thesis in its strict sense-the assertion that profitable growth would soon
be impossible, for narrowly economic reasons-was more widely supported before 1914
than thereafter,”. Rather it was thought that the depression was symptomatic of a further
decline in the ability of capitalism to function well. The reasons the writers gave varied
between individuals but generally were a mixture of two arguments, each with two
variants: the falling rate of profit which was caused either by a rising organic
composition of capital or rising wages; and realisation problems which were described
either in pure underconsumptionist terms or by disporportionality linked at times to a
rising rate of surplus value. The Marxist analysts used phrases like death agony,
impending downfall and pre-requisites for the revolutionary crisis, but they hung back
from using the actual word breakdown. [vol . 2,  pp. 3-23]
The Keynesian revolution was the first intellectual event to influence Marxism and,
according to H&K, it was a “watershed” (vol. 2,  p. 105). Previously explanations of the
end of capitalism had been based on both underconsumptionist ideas and  the central
relations. But the implication of Keynesianism was that the underconsumptionist
problems of capitalism could be remedied by government policy. This caused a divide,
with those that followed the Kalecki-Sraffa version of Marxism being considered as
nothing more that left Keynesians, while the “wide” majority of Marxist economists
concentrated on the falling rate of profit as the principle source of capitalist problems.
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy fought a long rear guard action for underconsumption as
an explanation of the end of capitalism that culminated in “Monopoly Capitalism” of
1966, but by the early 1970s most Marxists turned away from this type of explanation
(vol. 2, pp. 123-4). With the advent of Keynesianism, the Marxists had lost half of their
intellectual weaponry. [vol. 2, pp. 101-5]
                                                                                                                                              
taken.
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The 1970s saw combination of an intellectual event and an economic one: The
importance of the Okishio theorem began to be appreciated and, at the same time, the
long boom ended and it became clear that the rate of profit was falling. That is, it
became clear that, at least in terms of the most general model available, Marx’s
explanation of the falling rate of profit was incorrect and, at the same time, the actual
behaviour of the rate of profit demanded analysis. Two distinct reactions emerged: First
a group of writers defended the idea that the fall in the rate of profit was rooted in the
nature of capital. This line of thought started with Grossman, continued with Paul
Mattick and Roman Rosdolsky and was represented in the 1970s by a widely read
article by David Yaffe (vol. 2, p. 144) and an attack on the Okishio theorem by Anwar
Shaikh (vol. 2, p. 317). This literature which is know as the capital logic school, tends
to hark back to Marx, take the end of capitalism seriously and, except in the case of
Shaikh, ignore the Okishio theorem.
The second and larger profit squeeze group accepted the Okishio theorem and
interpreted the fall in the rate of profit as a consequence of rising wages. Writing in the
early 1970s, Andrew Glyn and Bob Sutcliff, among others, attributed these to
increasing union militancy. The emphasis shifted in the 1980s with Thomas Wiesskoff
blaming the fall on things like capitalist’s inability to defend themselves against rising
social security payments, Glyn and two colleagues citing labour shortages
(overaccumulation) and both noting the effects of rising resource prices. Generally this
work is descriptive and there is no mention of the end of capitalism. [vol. 2, pp. 318-22]
In the 1990s, after the publication of H&K’s “History”, both groups continued to
develop. Taking the direction of the capital logic school, Allan Freeman (1995, 1998)
and Andrew Kliman (1996, 1999) have attacked the Okishio theorem in terms of the
conventional model by trying to show that, in spite of a constant real wage, the rate of
profit may fall if what Hahn and Mathews (1964) called equilibrium dynamics is used
to describe the path of the economy instead of the traditional steady state analysis. On a
somewhat different front, Fred Moseley (1992, 1997) has argued, without a formal
model, that capitalist hiring of unproductive labour, particularly sales personnel, can
cause the rate of profit to fall without wage increases. Generally these works maintain
the end of capitalism tone and Moseley’s (1997) piece contains an assessment that
could have been written in the 1930s if not before 1914.
In the profit squeeze camp there have been improvements in empirical work and
developments on the theoretical side. A problem with the empirical work has been the
13
tendency to see rises in the organic composition of capital as causing a fall in the rate of
profit without simultaneously taking account of the compensating rise in labour
productivity. In a paper of great originality, Gerard Duménil and Domenic Lévy (1995)
set out a model of endogenous technical change that internalises this relation and uses it
to reproduce the actual movements of the wage and the rate of profit. On the theoretical
side there have been a number of papers that show how capital accumulation may cause
both a rise in the wage and a fall in the rate of profit9, but the wage movements had not
been convincingly integrated until Gilbert Skillman (1997), in a break through paper,
used the Rubinstein-Wolinsky matching and bargaining framework to make the
connection. Finally Duménil and Lévy (1999) have used their model of technical
change to try to reproduce the central relations, albeit in the context of rising wages.
The end of capitalism is hardly mentioned in this literature, primarily because the rising
real wages go directly against the traditional Marxian descriptions of this event.10
To summarise, the central relations are still an important Marxist theme but the end
of capitalism is not. Initially the explanations of the breakdown of capitalism had been
based primarily on underconsumptionist ideas, but the advent of Keynesianism made
this untenable and capitalism’s long survival softened the notion of a breakdown itself.
In the 1970s the fall in the rate of profit focused Marxist attention on this variable so
that interest in the central relations was maintained. But on a theoretical level the
necessity of having rising wages and perhaps, on a practical level, the evident good
health of capitalism itself, caused the theme of the end of capitalism to virtually
disappear from the main current of Marxist thought.
IV  Conclusion.
The model of this paper is important for two reasons: first it provides a hitherto
missing account of the central relations in the context of a constant wage and second it
opens the door to an ambitious Marxian research program.
The intrinsic problem in modelling the central relations in the context of a Marxian
model is the generation of the dynamics. The neo-classical growth model does this by
                                                
9 See Duménil and Lévy (1993, 1995), Skott (1992) and Michl (1994, 1999).
10 Two extreme reactions are indicative of the tension between the need to assume rising wages and the
idea of the end of capitalism: Foley (1986,  p. 156 ) sees socialism being brought on, not by the increasing
misery of the workers, but because their situation has so improved that they are prepared to take over. On
the other extreme, Laibman (1997) somewhat as Marx did, repeatedly stresses the worsening conditions
of the workers while, at the same time using a model which, when looked at carefully, exhibits rising
wages. (See Laibman (1998, p. 100) for an admission.)
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having the exogenously determined rate of growth of labour be different from the
endogenously determined rate of growth of capital when the model is out of steady
state. The natural Marxian assumptions of a fixed real wage and an infinitely elastic
supply of labour that characterise the formal Marxian models of the 1970s and 1980s11
meant that this mechanism could not operate. The only equilibrium of these models was
a steady state in which the labour supply increased in tandem with the capital stock and
the organic composition of capital, the rate of exploitation and the rate of profit all
remained constant. Duménil and Lévy (1999) broke this impasse in an eminently
Marxian way by inserting their model of endogenous technical change. Specifically, in
the face of symmetric technical possibilities, the relatively higher labour share generates
technical change that raises the organic composition of capital and, in steady state, the
wage in a way that the share remains constant so that the rate of profit falls. They thus
reproduce two out of the three central relations but at the cost of a rising wage. The
model of this paper returns to a version of the neo-classical mechanism: the infinitely
elastic labour supply still adjusts to keep the real wage constant but now it is the
difference between an exogenously determined rate of growth of land in efficiency units
and the endogenously determined rate of growth of capital that supplies the dynamics.
This mechanism generates the complete central relations in the context of a constant
wage.
There are three ways in which this model can be used: to serve as a basis for the
theme of the end of capitalism, to model past revolutions and current revolutionary
situations and, finally, to gain insights into the presently successful capitalism of the
industrialised world.
First the model could be extended to produce formalisations of the various accounts
of the breakdown of capitalism. The following three examples each emphasise a
different element of the central relations. For the first example one could insert a model
of cycles that is based on the relative instability of investment spending and then use the
rising rate of surplus value to show how the cycles would worsen over time. This would
formalise one of the arguments that Marx put forward in the Grundrisse. For the second
one could insert a mechanism that caused the income distribution to narrow as the
organic composition of capital rose. This would parallel the arguments made by Marx
when he emphasised trends and also those of the Erfurt programme. Finally, for the
                                                
11 See Morishima (1973), Steadman (1977), Roemer (1981) and Marglin(1984).
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third, one could insert a minimum level of capitalist consumption and show how the
falling rate of profit would cause a crisis within the capitalist class. This would detail
the argument made by Grossman and more loosely fit the ideas of the capital logic
school. In these ways and others the model could serve as a foundation for structures
that would bring the theme of the end of capitalism back into the Marxian discourse.
The second way in which the model can be used is for the analysis of revolutions.
The model is suitable for this both because of the subsistence wage assumption and
because land plays an important role, but one extension must be made. Population
pressure on the land played a role in Marx’s writing on revolutions, Theda Skocpol´s
seminal work (1979) emphasised the importance of this for the French (p.56), Russian
(p.132) and Chinese (p.47) revolutions, and this theme has continued in the descriptions
of recent revolutionary situations in Vietnam (Popkin, 1988), Latin America (Wickham-
Crowley, 1992), southern Mexico and the former Zaire (Renner,1997). However a
common theme of all these later writers (not to mention Lenin and Mao) is the
difference between the roles played by the peasants and the urban workers. All these
events had deep economic causes and much is known about what happened but they
have not been formally analysed. If the model of the present paper were extended so as
to treat peasants as a separate group, it could provide the basis for a formal description
of these events.
The third way in which the model can be used is to analyse the capitalism of the
industrialised world. Two problems immediately arise: First the actual situation of
rising real wages fits badly with the assumption of constant subsistence wages of the
model, and second the generally successful operation of the capitalist system calls into
question the relevance of any attempt to explain how the system will end.
With regard to the first problem it is clear that the model will have to be extended to
permit rising wages. One way to do this is to make the value of labour power or the
level of the subsistence wage an endogenous variable in line with Francis Green’s
(1991) interpretation of Marx’s labour market. In my forthcoming paper I have shown
that this leads to a model with either rising or falling wages depending on the size of
decreasing returns to land relative to technical progress. A revolution may occur only if
the parameters are such that technical progress is weaker.
A much more radical change, but one which is very much in the spirit of Marx,
would be to add a second type of capitalist who accumulated human rather than physical
capital. The force of this would be, since human capital cannot be centralised, that this
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would largely mitigate the wealth centralising force of the rising organic composition of
capital. This in turn could be used to show why the events described in the three
examples have not happened. With regard to the first, the thwarting of the centralisation
of wealth would stop investment from becoming a larger portion of demand and thus
break the mechanism that was responsible for the growing instability. With regard to the
second, the distribution of wealth would not narrow so much because of the nature of
human capital. This, incidentally, gives a deep insight into why revolutionary
tendencies persist in the third world where human capital accumulation has been
thwarted. Finally, with regard to the third, the empirical correlation between the
ownership of physical and human capital would suggest a reason why the capitalist
class has not experienced noticeable distress during periods of falling profits.
Careful perusal of these solutions to the first problem leads also to a resolution of the
second problem, that of the relevance of models of the end of capitalism in the context
of its current actual success. One may think, at first glance, that finding out what went
wrong with the Marxian predictions can hardly be seen as a salubrious Marxian research
programme. But this is the wrong reaction. Neo-classical research generally analyses
how capitalism works without considering why it exists. The Marxist perspective is to
understand why capitalism exists and how it might disappear. The examples above
show that this research programme leads exactly to answers to this type of question. For
example it leads to the conclusion that perhaps capitalism owes its continuing existence
to the accumulation of human capital, a conclusion that never could have come from
neo-classical analysis.
Appendix I.
1. Marx and Ricardo.
 A natural criticism of the model is that it is Ricardian rather than Marxian since fall
in the rate of profit is connected with a growing scarcity of land. Because this criticism
was not addressed in the forthcoming paper it is convenient to deal with it now. It is
argued, on the basis of his commentaries in Theories of Surplus Value, that Marx
distinguished himself from Ricardo by his assumption that capital was important in
agriculture, that the model reflects this distinction and finally, that it supports exactly
the difference in results that Marx emphasised.
Marx’s main comments on the falling rate of profit are contained in chapter XVI. A
careful look at these allows them to be transformed into the language of modern growth
17
theory. The greater part of the chapter is devoted to various consequences of Ricardo’s
failure to consistently take account of constant capital. Of particular importance is the
point that prices of individual goods are not, as Ricardo thinks, equal to their values but
rather are determined so that the rate of profit will be the same in all sectors. Then on
pages 466-7 Marx sets out his basic criticisms. Ricardo identifies the determination of
the rate of profit with the return on land that pays no rent. This is because he identifies
price with value and disregards constant capital in agriculture so the rate of profit is
merely the ratio of what remains after the worker has received his “equivalent” to that
equivalent. But this is wrong because agricultural produce generally sells at a cost-price
which is different from its value and is determined so that the rate profit in this sector
will be the same as that on non-agricultural capital. Marx’s general conclusion is that
the rate of profit is determined generally in the economy and not specifically in the
agricultural sector. In modern terms Ricardo has a two sector model in which
agricultural products are produced by land and labour and manufactures are produced
by these two factors plus capital while Marx prefers a three factor one sector
description. In this sense the model of this paper is Marxian rather than Ricardian.
At the beginning of his discussion of Ricardo’s theory of the falling rate of profit, in
a much quoted statement, Marx announces the difference between his and Ricardo’s
theories.
“The rate of profit falls, although the rate of surplus-value remains the same or rises,
because the proportion of variable capital to constant capital decreases with the
development of the productive power of labour. The rate of profit falls, not because
labour becomes less productive, but because it becomes more productive.” (p. 439)
What is not often pointed out is that Marx offers virtually no justification of this ringing
pronouncement. Finally on p. 468 he mentions unproductive labour, flirts with the idea
of cyclic overproduction and then tells the reader he must wait for the section on the
competition of capitals. However the theorem of this paper provides a precise
justification for the difference that Marx claimed existed between himself and Ricardo:
The rate of profit falls but labour productivity (defined as Y/L) and the rate of surplus
value rise, both of these movements because the ratio of variable to constant capital
(defined as wL/K) decreases.
2. Technical Progress and the Classical Model.
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The model of this paper is closely related to the classical model. The results make a
substantial contribution to a slender but pithy debate that has stretched over one
hundred and fifty years.
The starting point is the work of John Stuart Mill. He considered at great length, in
the context of the classical model, whether technical progress could counteract the
effects of population growth and allow the economy to grow at a constant rate with a
wage above subsistence level and a constant positive rate of profit. He thought that this
was a theoretical possibility but that in practice the force of population growth would
overwhelm that of technical progress (Mill (1965), vol. 2, Book I, chap. 13 and vol. 3,
Book IV, chap. 3).
Johansen (1967), referring to Ricardo and Smith rather than Mill, built a classical
model that provided a theoretical basis for Mill's thoughts. He showed that it was
possible to have a steady state in which technical progress just balanced population
growth. He further supported Mill's intuition by showing that higher potential capacity
for population growth would imply a lower equilibrium salary. However Johansen's
case was special in that he used a Cobb-Douglas production function. This meant that
one did not know if the results would hold for other production functions or what type
of technical progress was being supposed.
 Samuelson (1978) again touched on this theme. In the context of the same model, he
stated that if the technical progress were land augmenting then there would be a steady
state with the wage above subsistence and a positive constant rate of profit.
These results leave open the question of what would happen if the technical progress
was other than land augmenting. The model of the present paper is not exactly the
classical model: the momentary labour supply and its rate of growth do not depend on
the wage, and capital and labour do not enter the production in fixed proportions. This
difference means nothing can be said about the behaviour of the wage. But the model is
close enough to the classical model to allow a provisional extension of the results.
The results of the present model show a surprising break in the tendency to find
theoretical support for Mill's position. It seems to me that Samuelson's statement would
continue to hold as long as the rate of capital/labour augmenting progress remained
below that of land. But the moment it rises above things change radically. Steady state
is lost and, depending on whether the elasticity of substitution is greater or less than 1,
the system either explodes or collapses. In fact one has the somewhat paradoxical result
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that a rise in the rate of capital/labour augmenting technical progress may lead to a rapid
descent of the rate of profit.
 3. The Importance of the Absence of Depreciation.
One interpretation of the model is that there is zero depreciation. A natural question
is whether the addition of depreciation would cause problems for the result? Since I
have not worked this through my answer must be speculative. There are two ways of
looking at this.
The first way is to ask what would happen if one merely added depreciation to the
current model? A number of things might happen. In the case of s  < 1, if the marginal
product of capital fell to the rate of depreciation, growth might stop in finite time. Also,
since depreciation lowers profitability, in the case of s  > 1 the profit might not always
grow. Finally consider the rate of exploitation. For the case of s  > 1, K/L decreases and
so does the rate of exploitation. The negative effect of depreciation on capitalists falls as
K/L does. Thus adding depreciation would work against the tendency of the rate of
exploitation to fall. In the same way it would work against the rise in the rate of
exploitation in the s  < 1 case. Summarising, with depreciation added, in the case of s <
1 the model might stop growing, in the case of s > 1 the rate of profit might stop rising,
and in both cases the rate of exploitation might move differently. But it must be
emphasised that all of this might not be true since I have not worked through the model
for this case.
The second way to look at this is to suppose that Y is a net production function so
that depreciation is already taken into account. In this case one can calculate the gross
production function G(.),
                                           G(.) = Y(K,L,M,t) + d K.
One sees that this is a slightly unusual production function, but that it satisfies all the
normal assumptions. With this interpretation, the answer is that the results are not
affected by depreciation.
The real point is the following. The model is really just an example and there are no
strict rules for choosing between examples. I started with a one parameter model,
judiciously chosen, and showed that the value of the parameter had important and
simple effects on the behaviour of the model. The exercise carried out in the second
paragraph seems pointless to me. The alternative is to start from a general production
function and find general conditions that imply the results. This would be hard but not
20
impossible. I have not done it because  the purpose here is to convince the readers of the
fruitfulness of the approach and not the generality of the results.
4. The Rate of Exploitation and the Organic Composition of Capital.
Marx gave two definitions of the rate of exploitation: first, surplus value / value of
labour power and second surplus labour / necessary labour. These definitions are
equivalent in models with fixed coefficients and no joint production. Morishima (1974)
and Roemer (1981, chap. 2) used the second definition to define the rate of exploitation
in a Von Neuman model where values do not exist. Marglin (1984) based his definition
of the rate of exploitation in models with continuous substitution on the first definition.
Finally Petith (1997) noticed that the two definitions were not equivalent in models
with continuous substitution.
With regard to the first definition, one has to decide what surplus value is in terms of
this model. Marx made it clear that surplus value included rent paid to landlords
(Theories of Surplus Value, part II p. 453) so that it would seem that this should be
added. The problem arises with respect to capital gains from land. I am not aware of
any comments by Marx and furthermore the relation between value and capital gains
would seem to verge on the metaphysical. Besides, to include capital gains one would
have to solve for the path of prices that would be an added technical problem. For all
these reasons I have decided on the definition (8).
With regard to the second definition, I have decided to include it, in spite of its being
less tractable, because it seems to be more relevant when talking about revolution.
Roemer (1982, chap. 7) makes the point that a worker is exploited if there is another
situation in which he would be better off. The first definition makes no reference to
another situation. The second does. It shows the proportion by which the workers could
reduce the working day if they got rid of the capitalists.
The definition of the organic composition of capital is the ratio of the value of
constant capital to the value of labour power. There are a number of points: First, in a
one good model the value cancels so it is just the ratio of constant capital to the wage
bill both in physical units. This means that one does not have to worry about the
distinctions between the organic, the value, and the technical compositions of capital.
Second, constant capital is defined as the depreciation of fixed capital plus the amount
of raw materials that are used. Since there is neither depreciation nor raw materials,
constant capital would seem to be zero. Instead I take constant capital as the stock of
physical capital. This is frequently done (see Moseley (1991, chap. 1)), and is in the
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spirit of the way Marx used the concept, that is the organic composition of capital was
connected with employment and centralisation.
A much more delicate point is whether land should be included in constant capital,
i.e. K + PM. With regard to employment it would seem clear that it should not be. The
combination of accumulation of physical capital and the capital to labour ratio
determine employment. But with regard to centralisation the issue is less clear. If
accumulation causes the price of land to rise, then more must be spent on plots of land
and this could increase centralisation. In the end constant capital does not include land
mainly because of the technical problems.
5. The Relation to Meek's Work.
Meek (1967) set out a numerical example in which the increasing organic
composition of capital made the rate of profit first rise and then fall. Meek made
reference to capital accumulation, technical change, and the presence of land. It is
possible to see the model of this paper as being behind his numerical example. Thus it is
of interest to see if, in the case of s  < 1, there is an initial rise in the rate of profit before
the final fall. Meek's proposition in appendix II shows that this is, in fact, the case. Thus
this model provides the basis for an interpretation of Meek  (see Petith (1997b) for
details).
Appendix II. (A detailed version is available from the author.)
1. The Proof of the Theorem.
Lemma 1.  r = R.
Proof: (4) implies rPM =
¶ Y
¶ M
M + P
·
M . Thus R =
¶ Y
¶ K
K +
¶ Y
¶ M
M + P
·
M
K + PM
 = r, this
follows from (5); linear homogeneity and (2); and, finally, (3) and the implication of
(4).
The Case of r  ¹  0.
There are three basic relations in the model that relate to w, K
·
 nd Lm. However
these can be expressed in a number of ways. These will be set out at the beginning to
avoid cluttering the arguments with tedious calculations:
First consider the way the relation w = ¶ Y/ ¶ L, from (2), can be stated. Define
m = 
Med t
K b L1- b eg t
 ,
m is the land-aggregate ratio in efficiency units. Using (1) and (2)
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(A1) w = a K b L1-b eg t( ) -r + 1 - a( ) Med t( ) -r[ ] -
1+ r
r a K b L1- b eg t( ) - r - 1 1 - b( ) K b L- b eg t
(A2 )w = a 1 - b( ) a + 1- a( )
Med t
K b L1- b eg t
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
-ré 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
-
1+r
r K
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
b
eg t.
Using the new variable
(A3) w = a 1- b( ) a + 1- a( ) m- r[ ] -
1+r
r k b eg t.
Or rearranging this
(A4 ) w = a 1 - b( ) a mr + 1- a( )[ ] -
1+ r
r m1+r kb eg t.
Calculating ¶ Y/ ¶ K  and using (3) and (A1) gives
(A5)         r =
b
1 - b
wk- 1.
 Second, consider the expression for  K
·
. From (6) K
·
= Y - wL so that expressing the
RHS in terms of m
(A6 ) K
·
= a mr + 1- a( )[ ] -
1+ r
r ab mr + 1 - a( )[ ]Med t .
From (A2) with C1 = 
w
a 1 - b( )
(A7)                         kb eg t = C1 a + 1 - a( ) m
- r[ ]
1+r
r
(A8)                              k = C1
1
b a + 1- a( ) m-r[ ]
1+r
r
1
b e
- g
b
t
and since m-1Med t =  kb -1Keg t , (A6) implies                                     
(A9)                 K
·
= C1
b- 1
b a + 1- a( ) m-r[ ] -
1+ r
r
1
b a b + 1- a( ) m-r[ ] Ke
g
b
t
.
 Finally a different approach is useful when dealing with e1 and e2 . Define
                 y =
Lm
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
r b- 1( )
, x =
K
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
b
eg t, z =
M
L
ed t .
Then dividing (10) by L and raising both sides to the power -r  gives
(A10)                   w -r = a x- r y + 1- a( ) z- r .
Manipulating (A1) and substituting the definitions of x and z gives
(A11)                              1 - a( ) z-r = C1
-
r
1+ r x
-
r 2
1+ r - a x-r .
Substituting this into (A10) gives
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(A12)                               y =
w- r
a
xr -
C1
-
r
1+ r
a
x
r
1+r + 1.
(A12) gives essentially e2 in terms of x alone. Calculation Y/L in terms of x and z and
using (A11) gives
(A13)                 
Y
L
= a x- r + 1 - a( ) z-r[ ] -
1
r = C1
1
1+r x
r
1+ r ,
that is e1  in terms of x. This completes the preliminaries.
Although it seems reasonable that a solution should exist, given the sometimes-
unexpected nature of non-linear differential equations, it is safer to check.
Lemma 2, For the initial-value problem (11) there exists a unique solution K(t) defined
on 0 £  t < µ . (The argument is valid for r =0 as well as r ¹ 0.)
Proof: The proof uses the lemma of p. 8 and Theorem 1.7 of Grimshaw (1990). To save
space these results are not set out and the argument only sketched. Choose D ={K < K <
K
-
} and I = {-1 < t < T
_
} where T
_
 is arbitrary, 0 < K< K0 and K
-
 is defined so that K
cannot reach K
-
 for  t < T
_
. Then m is defined as a function of K and t, m(K, t) which
has the m following properties:
(A14)  m(K,t) is defined on the closure of (D,I), is positive, continuous, has continuous
partials and is bounded.
Finally define f(K,t) from (A9). (A14) and the form of (A9) show that f(K,t) satisfies
the conditions of the lemma of p.8 so that it satisfies a Lipschitz condition on (D,I). An
application of Theorem 1.7 then shows that a solution to (11) exists and is unique on
0 £  t < T
_
.
Lemma 3.  K
·
 > 0 for all t  . 
Proof: The argument that K
·
 > 0 is simple. Define L(K,t) by (A6).  Note that
(A15)    L(K,t) > 0  for all t when K > 0:
Suppose that L(K,t*) = 0 for some t*. Then, since K > 0, 
 
lim
t ® t*
 m = lim
t ® t*
k = ¥  so that
RHS (A3) ®  ¥  which is impossible.
Then, since K(t) > 0 for all t (because K0 > 0  and K
·
³  0) , (A15) implies that m(t) >
0 for all t and the result follows from (A6).
Lemma 4. m®  0.
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Proof: Suppose m ®  A > 0. By (7) and lemma 2, L ®  0 and k ®  ¥  so the RHS (A3) ®
¥  which is impossible.
Lemma 5. Let r  > 0. For any e , e ' > 0 there is a t* such that for t > t*
(A16)          K
·
  > (C2 - e )ed t,                    K
·
 < (C2 + e )ed t
(A17)          K ( t )>
C2 - e
d
- e '
æ 
è 
ö 
ø e
d t           K ( t )<
C2 + e
d
+ e '
æ 
è 
ö 
ø e
d t
where C2 = (1-a )-1/r M.
Proof: By lemma 4 and r  > 0 the coefficient of ed t in (A6) approaches C2 as t
approaches infinity. This gives (A16).
    Integrating the first of the inequalities in (16) from t0 to t, and , for any e ' > 0,
choosing t* so that, for t > t*,
                              - K(t0)e-d t +
C2 - e
d
e
-d t - t0( )é 
ë 
ù 
û 
> -e '
gives the first inequality of (A17). The other follows similarly.
Lemma 6. k®¥  or   0  and R®  0  or ¥   as  r  > 0 or < 0.
Proof: We show first that
(A18)        k®¥   or   0  as  r > 0 or < 0,
the rest of the lemma then follows immediately from (A5) and lemma 1.
First let r > 0. Writing m1+r kb eg t  in terms of M, K and k, substituting for K with the
inequality (A17) and putting this into (A4) shows that k ®  ¥ .
 Second when r  < 0 it is immediate from (A3) that  k ®  0.
 Lemma 7. Let r  < 0, then e1and e2 approach constants.
Proof: (A3) and lemma 4 imply that x®  a constant. (A13) and (8) then imply the result
for e1 while (A12) and (9) imply it for e2.
Lemma 8.Let r  > 0, then e1 and e2 ®¥ .
Proof: From (A3) and lemma 4, x®¥ .  (A13)  and (8) imply the result for e1. x®¥  and
(A11) imply that z-r ® 0, (A10) implies y®¥ , and, finally (9) implies the result for e2.
Lemma 9. Let r  < 0 and choose an e > 0. Then there exists a t* and constants C4, C5(e )
and C6(t*,e )  such that for t > t*
(A19)                                 
K
·
K
> C4 - e( ) e
g
b
t
(A20)                                  K ( t )< C6 t*, e( ) e
C5 e( )
b
g
e
g
b
t
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where  C4 = C1
b- 1
b a
-
1+r
r
1
b ab ,  C5(e ) = C4 + e , and  C6 t*, e( ) = K(t*)e
- C5 e( )
b
g
e
g
b
t *
.
Proof: Writing (A9) as   K
·
= g(m)Ke
g
b
t
  and noting that g(m) ® C4 by lemma 4 gives
(A19). A(20) follows from integrating (A19).
Lemma 10. Let r   < 0, then there is a t* such that t > t* implies k
·
 < 0 andR
·
 > 0.
Proof: Write (A2) as
                   C1 = a + 1 - a( )
M
Kk b- 1e g-d( ) t
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
-ré 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
-
1+r
r
k b eg t = G(K,k , t ).
Differentiating totally with respect to t
(A21)                     k
·
= -
1
Gk
GK K
·
+ Gt
æ 
è 
ö 
ø .
Since clearly  Gk > 0, the lemma will follow from lemma 1 and (A5) once it is shown
that
(A22)                      GK K
·
 ®  0
(A23)                      Gt ®  C1g  > 0.
Using lemma 9 and calculating GK we have
(A24)     
- a + 1 - a( ) m- r[ ] -
1+r
r
- 1
1 + r( ) 1 - a( ) M - r k - r 1-b( ) + b e r g - d( ) + g[ ] t
C6(t*,e )
r e
r C 5 e( )
b
g
e
g
b
t
C4 - e( ) e
g
b
t
º H(t)< GK K
·
< 0
where H(t) is the term that precedes the º  for an arbitrary e  > 0, a t* which is
determined by  e  as in lemma 9 and t > t* , and where the dependence of m and k on t
is taken into account in the definition of H(t). Using (A8)  and lemma 4 one has
lim
t® ¥
H(t)= C8 limt ®¥
eate- be
g
b
t
where  a = -
g
b
-r 1 - b( ) + b[ ] + r g - d( ) + g + g
b
> 0,  b = -r C5(e )
b
g
 > 0 ,
C8 = -a
-
1+ r
r
- 1
1 + r( ) 1- a( ) M -r C7
-r 1- b( ) +b C6(t*, e )
r C4 - e( )  and C7 = C1
1
b a
1+r
r
1
b . Taking
logs and using L'Hospital's rule, one has
lim
t® ¥
H(t)= 0,
which, from (A24), implies (A22). Finally calculation of Gt, (A7) and lemma 4 imply
(A23) immediately.
26
Lemma 11.  Let r  > 0 . Then  e
·
1 > 0,e
·
2 > 0.
Proof: (A2) can be written as
(A25) C1 = a + 1 - a( )
M - r
x
b - 1
b v
æ 
è 
ç 
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ø 
÷ 
- r
é 
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ê 
ê 
ê 
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ú 
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ú 
-
1+r
r
x º J ( x , v ).
where  v = Ke
g
b
-d
æ 
è 
ç 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ 
÷ t
 . Since  v
·
 > 0  from lemma 3 and (7) and since a calculation shows
that Jv < 0 and Jx > 0, the differentiation of (A25) gives x
·
 > 0 and the result for e1
follows from (A13) and (8).
Now consider the result for e2. Differentiating (A12) and dropping the second term
in the square brackets in (A25) to create an inequality gives
(A26)
dy
dx
= r
xr- 1
a
w-r -
1
r + 1
C1
-
r
1+ r x
-
r 2
r+ 1
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
> r
xr- 1
a
w-r -
1
r + 1
C1
- r
1+r
- r
2
1+ r a - r
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú = r
xr- 1
a
w-r -
1
1+ r
w
a 1- b( )
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
- r
> 0.
The differentiation with respect to time of (A12) and x
·
 > 0 then imply  y
·
 > 0 and the
result  follows from (9) and the definition of y.
Lemma 12.  Let r  > 0 . Then there is a t* such that t  > t* implies k
·
> 0 andR
·
< 0.
Proof: Once it is shown that  k
·
> 0  the lemma will follow from lemma 1 and (A5) .
Thus from (A21), since Gk > 0 the lemma will follow once it is shown that there is a t*
such that  GK K
·
+ Gt < 0 fort > t*. First consider GK K
·
.  A calculation and (A7)
show that
(A27)         GK K
·
= - C1 a m
r + 1 - a( )[ ] - 1 1 + r( ) 1 - a( ) K
·
K
.
Choose e , e ' such that
(A28)                        d 1 -
C2 - e
C2 + e + e ' d
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 1 + r( ) - g r < 0.
Then from lemma 5 there is a t* such that for t > t*
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K
·
K
>
C2 - e
C2 + e
d
+ e '
= d
C2 - e
C2 + e + e ' d
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ .
Then, putting this inequality into (A27), taking the limit and using lemma 4
lim
t® ¥
GK K
·
£ - C1 1 + r( ) d
C2 - e
C2 + e + e ' d
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ .
Next consider Gt. A calculation and (A7), taking the limit and using lemma 4 gives
lim
t® ¥
Gt = C1 g - 1+ r( ) g - d( )[ ] .
Putting the last two inequalities together and using (A28) gives, as was to be shown,
           lim
t® ¥
GK K
·
+ Gt £ C1 -rg + 1 + r( ) d 1 -
C2 - e
C2 + e + e ' d
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
< 0.
Lemma 13. Let r  > 0 . Then there exists a t* such that t > t* implies that e
·
1 > 0 and
e
·
2 > 0.
Proof: As in lemma 11, x
·
 > 0 for t > t* . The result for e1 then follows from (A13) and
(8). Next write (A2) as a function of m and x. Lemma 4 implies that  x ®¥ . (A26)  then
implies that dy/dx > 0. This and x
·
> 0 imply  that  y
·
 > 0 so that the result for e2 llows
from (9) and the definition of y.
The case of r  = 0.
Lemma 14. Let r  = 0. Then k®0  and R®¥.
Proof: In this case the production function has the form
(A29)               Y  = Kab L(1-b )a M1-a eq t
where q  = ag +(1-a )d . A calculation shows
(A30)                r = 
b
1 - b
L
K
w.
Using the wage equals the marginal product of labour condition
(A31)
L
K
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
1- 1-b( ) a
=
1
C1
K a- 1M1-a eq t ,
so that the specific path of K must be found. Substitute (A31)  into the basic equation
for K
·
 to get
(A32)                           K
·
= C9K
ab
1- 1-b( ) a e
q
1
1- 1-b( ) a
t
.
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where C9 =
1
C1
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
1-b( ) a
1- 1- b( ) a
M
1
1- 1-b( ) a .Integrating this from t to t0 gives
(A33) K ( t )= K1- a(t0)e- bt - C9
1- a
b
e
- b t - t0( )
- 1æ è 
ö 
ø 
é 
ë 
ù 
û 
1
1- a
e
b
1- a
t
where a =
ab
1 - 1 - b( ) a
and b = q
a
1 - 1- b( ) a
   and a < 1. Taking the limit, for any
small e  there is a t* such that t > t* implies that
                                 K ( t )>
1- a
b
C9 - e
é 
ë 
ù 
û 
1
1- a
e
b
1- a
t
Substituting this into (A31),
L
K
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
1- 1-b( ) a
> C10e
a - 1( ) b
1- a
+q
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
t
where  C10 = 
1
C1
1- a
b
C9 - e
é 
ë 
ù 
û 
a- 1
1- a
M1-a . Thus  k® 0   and, from (A30) and lemma 1,
R ®¥ .
Lemma 15. Let r  = 0 . There exists a t* such that t > t* implies k
·
< 0 andR
·
> 0.
Proof: From (A33)
(A34)    K a- 1( t ) eq t = A( t )
a- 1
1- a ,
where  A(t) =K1- a(t0)e
1- a
a- 1
q t
- C9
1 - a
b
e
bt0 +
1- a
a- 1
q t
- e
b+ 1- a
a- 1
q
æ 
è 
ç ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ ÷ tæ 
è 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ . A calculation shows that
there is a t* such that, for t > t*, A
·
< 0. Thus, from (A34), K a - 1eq t
·æ 
è 
ö 
ø > 0 for t > t*. This
and (A31) imply the result for k
·
  and thus (A30) and lemma 1 imply it for R
·
.
Lemma 16. Let r  = 0 . Then e1 and e2 are constants.
Proof: Replacing (1) with (A29) in (10) and dividing by L gives
(A35) w =
K
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
ba Lm
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
1-b( ) a M
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
1-a
eq t .
On the other hand the wage equals the marginal product of labour implies
(A36) w = 1- b( ) a K
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
ba M
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
1-a
eq t.
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(A35), (A36) and (9) imply the result for e2. Fr m (A29) 
Y
L
=
K
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
ba M
L
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
1-a
eq t  so that
the result for e1 follows from (A36) and (8).
Proof of the Theorem: The theorem follows from lemmas 6-8 and 10-16.
2. Proof of Meek's Proposition.
From the solution to (11) one can write the path of R, R(K0,t), as a function of t and
the initial condition K0.
Meek's Proposition.  For the model (1)-(10) let r  > 0. Then lim
K 0 ® 0
R
·
K0, 0( ) > 0 and there
exists a t* such that t > t* implies R
·
K0, t( ) < 0.
That is, when the elasticity of substitution between the aggregate and land is less than
one and the initial capital stock is small enough, capital accumulation first causes the
rate of profit to rise and then, afterwards, fall.
Proof: From (A2)
(A37)
w
a 1 - b( )
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
-
1+r
r
= a k
-b
r
1+r e
-
r
1+ r
g t
+ 1 - a( ) M -r e-rd tk
- 1-b( ) r -
r
1+r
b
e
gr-
r
1+ r
g
æ 
è 
ç 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ 
÷ t
K r .
Differentiating this with respect to time, letting t = 0 and taking the limit as K
approaches zero gives
(A38)0 = a -b
r
1+ r
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ k
-b
r
1+r
- 1
k
·
+ 1 - a( ) M - r k
- 1- b( ) r-
r
1+ r
b
r lim
K ® 0
K r - 1K
·
+ a k
-b
r
1+ r -
r
1 + r
g
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ .
Since K
·
= Y - wL, from (1) and (A1) we have
(A39) K r - 1K
·
= a k 1- b( ) r + 1 - a( ) M - r K r[ ] -
1+r
r K r ab k 1-b( ) r + 1 - a( ) M - r K r[ ]  .
Let t = 0. From (A37) lim
K ® 0
k > 0 and finite. Thus (A39) implies lim
K ® 0
K r- 1 K
·
 = 0. Thus
(A38) and the positive finite limit of k imply  l
K ® 0
k
·
< 0 . The first part of the result now
follows from (A5) and lemma 1, and the second part from the previous theorem.
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